Abstract: Much has been written about the global convergence on constitutional supremacy. Yet, a closer look suggests that while constitutional convergence trends are undoubtedly extensive and readily visible, expressions of constitutional resistance or defiance may in fact be regaining ground worldwide. This may point to a paradox embedded in global constitutionalism: the more expansive constitutional convergence trends are, the greater the likelihood of dissent and resistance are. In this article, I chart the contours of three aversive responses to constitutional convergence: neo-secessionism, nullification, and deference to local authority, and draw on an array of comparative examples to illustrate the distinct logic and characteristics of each of these responses. Taken together, these increasingly common expressions of defiance provide ample evidence that global constitutionalism is not the only game in town. Neo-secessionism, nullification, and other forms of constitutional dissent and "opting out" may thus be viewed as a reaction against the centralization of authority and the decline of the local in an increasingly-constitutionally and otherwise-universalized reality.
Introduction
Much has been written about the global convergence on constitutional supremacy, perhaps even the emergence of a global constitutional order, most visible in the context of rights. 1 The growing normative and empirical purchase of constitutional convergence at both the national and transnational level is indeed unquestionable. Its accelerating advance, in particular in the area of rights and the expansion of judicial review powers may be linked to broader trends of universalism, globalization, post-nationalism, and the corresponding erosion of the local and the particular. Yet, a closer look suggests that while constitutional convergence trends are undoubtedly extensive and readily visible, expressions of constitutional resistance or defiance -secessionism, nullification, and "opting out," among other trends and mechanisms -may in fact be regaining ground worldwide.
2 From Catalonia and Flanders, to Kashmir, Aceh, and Kurdistan, separatist sentiments worldwide are enjoying something of a heyday, rather than a decline. But quite apart from these "traditional" hotspots of secessionism, in recent years, a new, populist line of separatism and anti-globalization ideology seems to have taken root in an increasing number of places. Distinguished from earlier grievances against globalization, the explicit target of this neo-secessionist trend is global constitutionalism in both its underlying liberal-universalist ideological outlook and its sovereignty-curbing jurisdictional and institutional manifestations. The Brexit campaign in the UK, the blatant defiance of pan-European constitutional norms in Poland, Hungary or Turkey, President Trump's dramatic decision to pull the U.S. out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), UNESCO, and the Paris Agreement (aka the Paris climate accord) and to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Venezuela's and Trinidad and Tobago's withdrawal from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, or several developing world nations' threats to withdraw from the International Criminal Court are merely a few examples of this neo-secessionist impulse. Meanwhile, from recalcitrant states in the U.S. to member states of the European Union (EU), the notion of an issue-based withdrawal from the overarching "federal" pact-what is often referred to in American constitutional thought as nullification-is commonly invoked. In fact, core elements of Hungary's resistance to an EU-imposed refugee policy, India's Muslim minority's resistance to attempts at constitutional curtailment of its self-jurisdiction in certain personal status matters, the repeated tension between Texas or Arizona and the American federal constitutional establishment over the implementation the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare") plan or the legalization of same-sex marriage, the landmark German Federal Constitutional Court rulings on the constitutional status of Germany in relation to the Treaty of Maastricht or the Lisbon Treaty, or the withdrawal of countries from international pacts, treaties, and tribunals address the question of subnational (or sub-supranational) constitutional sovereignty and the right to override centralizing legislative and regulatory authority. Parallel to the neo-secessionism and nullification-like sentiments, a third, intra-constitutional mode of reaction -deference to local authorities-has been institutionalized and expanded in an increasing number of transnational, quasi-constitutional pacts. The March 2015 Brussels Declaration of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers stressed forcefully how important subsidiarity has become for the future of the European Convention of Human Rights system. The "margin of appreciation" principleessentially a judicial doctrine whereby supra-national courts allow states to have a measure of diversity in their interpretation of human rights treaty obligations, based on local traditions, heritage, and context-is repeatedly invoked by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its politically-sensitive rulings.
This broad divergence trend is echoed even in the realm of constitutional rights discourse, the more "convergence-prone" area of constitutional law. 3 Whereas the wording of constitutional bills of rights around the world look more similar than ever, and a supposedly apolitical, Esperanto-like interpretive method of proportionality has become widespread, there is no jurisprudential (let alone political) consensus concerning the predominantly liberal "global constitutional canon" with respect to morally contested matters such religious expression, gay rights, reproductive freedoms, or the right to die. In fact, when one turns her gaze beyond the dozen or so "usual suspect" jurisdictions often referred to in comparative constitutional law to explore constitutional rights jurisprudence in the EU "periphery" or in U.S. states, let alone in the so-called "global south" or the "Islamic world," divergence from, and at times resistance towards, "global constitutionalism" is quite common. Such opposition manifests itself even within the usual suspect group of jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of India's conservative ruling in Koushal v. NAZ Foundation, the reaction among Italian nationalists to the ECtHR first ruling in the Lautsi v. Italy Case, the rejection in Russia of progressive ECtHR rulings, or the radical right resistance to the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling in the U.S. are merely recent examples. Aiding popular resistance in many of these instances is the age-old and much-discussed counter-majoritarian difficulty embedded in judicial review. 4 It provides a readymade conceptual and rhetorical platform for nationalist voices critical of the democracy deficit and "liberalism by stealth" embedded in global constitutionalism. Meanwhile, in the political sphere, support for non-liberal, populist countercosmopolitanism is on the rise, with figures such as Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Boris Johnson, Marine Le Pen, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Rodrigo Duterte, Heinz-Christian Strache, Viktor Orbàn, or Jaroslaw Kaczyński having ascended to prominence with expanded popular support. In fact, sociologists and political scientists have identified a "populist explosion" worldwide. This explosion is unified in its emphasis on nationalist sentiments, popular sovereignty, and majority rule, at the expense of pluralism and minority rights, as well as by its sense of "authentic localism" rhetorically constructed as an alternative to "open borders," "elite government," a "corrupt center," and to the all-encompassing trend toward the transfer of controversial political issues to the hands of supranational institutions, courts, or central banks. 5 These impulses are often translated into the quest for greater control of apex courts' composition and jurisdiction, nationalist legislation and constitutional amendments on matters such as sovereignty, citizenship, and immigration. Policy fronts are opened against supposed welfare abusers or minority groups with special entitlements, complementing steadfast positions against global constitutionalist values viewed as an elitist liberal project. These sentiments are not restricted to the right-wing of the political spectrum; activists on the left have also mounted an anti-globalization critique, often directed at supra-national, quasi-constitutional trade agreements and investor rights that are seen as favoring big business and corporate interests at the expense of democratic representation and national, constitutional, and fiscal sovereignty. In the following pages, I chart the contours of three aversive responses to constitutional convergence: neo-secessionism, nullification, and deference to local authority. The first represents an all-out break with a given constitutional governance system; the second provides for an issue-based opting-out alternative; and the third reflects a self-corrective mechanism that allows for constitutional diversity within a larger political and constitutional pact. I conclude by suggesting that whereas at first glance the reemergence of such constitutional dissent sentiments appears counter-intuitive in an age of apparent globalization, it may actually reflect a predictable reaction to, perhaps even a backlash against, powerful global convergence vectors. When understood against the backdrop of formidable centripetal forces of political, cultural, and economic globalization, the rise of a new trans-national constitutional order and judicial class and the corresponding decrease in the autonomy of "Westphalian" constitutionalism, as well as an ever-increasing deficit of democratic legitimacy, counter pressures for preserving a given sub-national unit's, region's, or community's unique constitutional legacy, cultural-linguistic heritage, and political voice seem destined to intensify, not decline. Neo-secessionism, nullification, and other forms of constitutional dissent and "opting out" may thus be viewed as a reaction against the centralization of authority and the decline of the local in an increasingly-constitutionally and otherwiseuniversalized reality. Taken together, these expressions of defiance may point to a paradox embedded in global constitutionalism: the more expansive constitutional convergence trends are, the greater the likelihood of dissent and resistance are. Moreover, because secessionist alternatives often prove complex and costly and thus hard to implement, issue-based withdrawal or built-in subsidiarity and deference mechanisms are likely to gain further support in the coming years as more measured and efficient forms of dissent in an age of constitutional convergence.
I Separatist and Neo-Secessionist Sentiments Worldwide
Contrary to what many globalists and post-nationalists may have predicted or wished, separatist impulses, rather than disappearing into the currents of history, have instead gained renewed momentum worldwide. Within a matter of weeks during the autumn of 2014, for example, a series of events relit the fuse of dormant separatist sentiment. In September, nearly half of Scottish voters expressed their desire for independence in a widely publicized referendum Following the trend, in September 2016, a referendum was held in the Republika Srpska-a semi-autonomous entity within Bosnia and Herzegovinaon holding a separate independence day for that entity in blatant defiance of an explicit BiH Constitutional Court ruling that declared unconstitutional the introduction of such independence-day or holding of a referendum to approve it. 8 The constitutional disobedience aside, an overwhelming 99 % of the votes casted supported the creation of an independent "Day of Republika Srpska." A year later, Republika Srpska leaders vowed to ignore another BiH Constitutional Court ruling that held that military bases within Republika Srpska's territory are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the BiH government (and thus expandable to NATO troops).
9 And in Puerto Rico-a U.S. territory-a "full statehood" movement has been gaining momentum ( Meanwhile, massive secessionist protests have occurred in oil-rich provinces of Venezuela (Zulia) and Bolivia (Pando, Santa Cruz, Tarija). Indigenous rights movements-think the Zapatista Movement in the Mexican state of Chiapascontinue to actively resist federal authority. 13 In short, rumors of secession's demise in the age of global convergence have been greatly exaggerated; the list of secessionist movements and autonomy-aspiring regions and movements is as long today as it has ever been. However, in recent years a new trend-neo-secessionism-has arisen as an explicitly counter-convergence mode of response to various globalization trends, constitutional and otherwise. The rhetoric invoked by its proponents directly and explicitly targets elements of new constitutionalism and thrives on voters' intuitive resentment of an externally-imposed yet rigid set of rules and norms and the consequential limitations they impose on national and local policy choices. The explicit target of this neo-secessionist trend is global constitutionalism in its various ideological and institutional guises. The 2016 Brexit referendum-an unprecedented, popular rejection of supra-national political and constitutional convergence-is a prime example, but populist-nationalist opposition groups in other EU member-states, from the Nordic countries to the Netherlands, Austria to Greece, have voiced grave concerns about the threat to national sovereignty posed by the pan-European constitutional project. The financial crisis of 2008, in particular, boosted public support for separatist parties that questioned the logic and future of the "ever closer union" project.
14 In Greece, the Golden Dawn party has turned from a fringe, neo-Nazi pariah party that received less than five thousand votes in 1996, into the third largest party in that country, while the Syriza party has advanced from a small radical left party to the main opposition, and as of 2015, the governing party. Both parties advance very different agendas, but share a core "Greece first" line. In Spain, the leftist Podemos ("We Can") party promotes an outspoken anti-globalization and anti-establishment agenda that seeks to The notion of popular constitutionalism (suggesting essentially that people should play an active role in constitutional interpretation and "retain authority in day-to-day administration of fundamental law") is not foreign to American constitutional thought. 17 The U.S. Constitution, this body of literature suggests, belongs to the people at least as much as it belongs to politicians, courts and jurists and so ought to take a more substantial role in people's lives. However, the "ordinary people" Trump and other populist neo-secessionists purport to speak for are a different type of "people"
18
; they do not reflect the entire American citizenry and are framed as supposed left-behind victims of corrupt, mostly invisible elites that somehow rule the country and the world. These populist voices are not in the business of pro-active constitutional citizenship along the lines suggested by popular constitutionalists such as Larry Kramer or Mark Tushnet.
19 Rather, they are advancing a claim that the constitution and its interpretation have been captured by a small, unrepresentative social stratum, mostly urban, educated and well-off economically, that draws upon the constitutional order to advance a set of worldviews and policy preferences that are unrepresentatively liberal or neo-liberal, cosmopolitan, and/or business friendly. Predictably, President Trump invoked a "protecting the ordinary people" rationale repeatedly in his neo-secessionist move to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate Agreement. In making his January 2017 decision to pull the U.S. out of the TPP-a twelve-nation trade agreement (including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, and until 2017, the U.S.) that make up for an annual gross domestic product of nearly $28 trillion that represents roughly 40 % of global GDP and one-third of world trade-President Trump suggested that: "it is the policy of my In his June 2017 announcement that the U.S. would withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, Trump followed a similar "protect the ordinary people" rationale by suggesting that U.S. compliance with the Paris Agreement could "cost America as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025, according to the National Economic Research Associates." Remaining in the Agreement, he went on to suggest, would cost the U.S. economy "close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs, while households would have $7,000 less income, and in many cases, much worse than that." Turning to an "us versus them" sentiment, another common theme of the new secessionism, Trump suggested that participation would require the U.S. to pay a significant sum to the Green Climate Fund that was set up by the Accord. "So we're going to be paying billions and billions and billions of dollars and we're already way ahead of anybody else," he said. "Many of the other countries haven't spent anything. And many of them will never pay one dime."
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As the voting patterns in the Brexit referendum, the American presidential election, the Austrian presidential election (all took place in 2016), and the French elections (2017) indicate, the current backlash brings together strange bedfellows, left and right, as "political economy" considerations often yield nativist, anti-immigrant outlook, alongside broader anti-establishment, "periphery versus center" or "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elites" sentiments. 22 As the tides of globalization and neo-liberalism are eroding previously secure social strata, neo-secessionist sentiments are erected as ideological breakwaters. The outcome, more often than not, is a denigration of liberal- Opting Out of "Global Constitutionalism"
democratic constitutional values and their supporters within the urban intelligentsia, the academia, the media, or the courts.
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Proponents of neo-secessionism commonly invoke anti-constitutional convergence rhetoric. British Prime Minister Theresa May has on multiple occasions expressed her support for the UK opting out of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and stated that her 2020 electoral campaign would be based on a motto of freeing the UK from the jurisdiction of the ECHR.
The ECHR can bind the hands of parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, makes us less secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals-and does nothing to change the attitudes of governments like Russia's when it comes to human rights, May said. "So regardless of the EU referendum, if we want to reform human rights laws in this country, it isn't the EU we should leave but the ECHR and the jurisdiction of its court." 24 In the same spirit, May has recently gone on record stating that we should do even more to restrict the freedom and the movements of terrorist suspects when we have enough evidence to know they present a threat, but not enough evidence to prosecute them in full in court. And if human rights laws get in the way of doing these things, we will change those laws to make sure we can do them.
25
Rejectionist discourse against elements of global constitutionalism has taken place in other pertinent contexts. American constitutional discourse, for example, has witnessed fierce debates over the desirability and legitimacy of reference to foreign precedents-often reflecting the supposedly international liberal constitutional rights canon-in constitutional interpretation. 26 It has been In its anxiety to protect the so-called rights of LGBT persons and to declare that Section 377 violates the right to privacy, autonomy and dignity, the High Court has extensively relied upon the judgments of other jurisdictions. Though these judgments shed considerable light on various aspects of this right and are informative in relation to the plight of sexual minorities, we feel that they cannot be applied blindfolded for deciding the constitutionality of the law enacted by the Indian legislature.
29
In other words, much like in the U.S. and elsewhere, foreign reference is more likely to support a universalist position, while a rejection of such sources is more likely to support a particularist position. Opting Out of "Global Constitutionalism"
constantly challenged by particularist voices that stress the irrelevance of, and even threat posed by global constitutional discourse to local conditions and traditions. 30 Israel, for example, defines itself as "Jewish and democratic state." In recent years, the nationalist coalition government led by Benjamin Netanyahu is forcefully advancing the "Israel is a Jewish state" ticket, thereby threating to alter the foundational two-tenet character of Israel as "a Jewish and democratic state." 31 Since 2014, it promotes the adoption of a new Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People, dubbed the "nation-state bill" aimed at bolstering the country's Jewish-national character while limiting its democratic character; the proposed bill would instruct the Supreme Court to favor, in case of a conflict, the "Jewish" (however difficult this term remains to define) over the "democratic" character of the state. In August 2017, to pick one example, Minister of Justice of the Ha'Bait Ha'Yehudi (the Jewish Home) party declared publicly in reaction to a moderately liberalizing ruling of the Supreme Court in the context of asylum seeker rights that matters of demography and the Jewish majority have become a legal blind spot for the Court in as much as they carry no decisive weight in comparison to questions of individual rights. "Zionism should not continue, and I say here, it will not continue" the Minister added, "to bow down to the system of individual rights interpreted in a universal way that divorces them from the history of the Knesset and the history of legislation that we all know." accident. 33 The Vatican reaction, alongside the radical right resistance to the Obergefell v. Hodges ruling in the U.S., illustrates how the rise of liberal constitutional jurisprudence and rights discourse may itself trigger neo-secessionist or nullification-like reactions. Direct attacks against constitutional actors that are seen as advancing liberal values and cosmopolitan outlook have taken place in an increasing number of countries, ranging from Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Israel to Colombia and Venezuela. 34 In all of these settings, the constitutional arena, and in particular high courts invested with constitutional review powers, have been portrayed by a nationalist-populist regime (in some cases more accurately than others) as bastions of liberalism and cosmopolitanism (relative to the political settings within which they operate) that are either out of touch with or posing a threat to national values and traditions, and as unduly prioritizing minority rights, economic and cultural globalization, and/or the worldviews and policy preferences favored by urban intelligentsia and business elites. Under such conceptualization, constitutional review, ideally a power-diffusing, minority-protecting and rights-preserving enterprise, is seen as an enemy of the ordinary people and the policy preferences of the cultural and economic hinterlands. Opting Out of "Global Constitutionalism"
"the bastion of everything in Poland that is bad." 36 A PiS orchestrated assault on the Polish Constitutional Tribunal's jurisdiction, composition, and overall independence -indeed an all-out attempt at "constitutional capture" -is ongoing.
37
In the Philippines, President Duterte has taken the counter-constitutionalism campaign a step further by declaring on multiple occasions his disregard for human rights and his commitment to contravening constitutional due process guarantees. 38 In response to suggestions that he might be facing charges before Meanwhile, anti-globalization activists oppose what they term the "new constitutionalism"-the unheralded diffusion of a set of quasi-constitutional supranational treaties and institutions that place global economic governance beyond democratic reach and promote uneven development by privileging transnational corporations at the expense of the world's economic hinterlands. 45 From Toronto to Hamburg, massive, at times violent, demonstrations against G20 leaders and their supposedly pro-globalization and pro-corporations plans are a common sight. Local resistance and "opting out" threats, genuine or strategic, are quite common. A most recent example is Wallonia's adamant objection to the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Ironically, using the constitutional instruments available to them-Articles 207 and 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (requiring unanimity in the negotiation and conclusion of trade agreements), and Articles 127, 128 and 167 of the Belgian Constitution (requiring cooperation between the parliaments of the Flemish and French communities in negotiating and ratifying international treaties; these treaties take effect only after they have received the approval of the Parliament of each of the two communities)
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-Flemish activists were able to temporarily prevent settlement of the treaty in the face of trans-Atlantic concordance. Concerns with the new constitutionalism's "democracy deficit", unaccountable arbitration tribunals and overall threat to national sovereignty, as well as with the new constitutionalism's embedded prioritization of international business inter- Opting Out of "Global Constitutionalism" ests over those of local growers, producers and consumers, have driven antiglobalization constitutional challenges worldwide. 47 In any and all of these neo-secessionist episodes, varied as they are, elements of global constitutionalism-in particular, its liberal ideational leanings, transnational institutional structures, and embedded preference for universal rights over local traditions-have come to be associated in nationalist-populist discourse with the interests and worldviews of corrupt and irremediable "elites," and with unduly privileged "winners" and tone-setters, whether culturally, economically, politically or legally. In this discourse, the values of global constitutionalism ought to be limited or abandoned altogether by "we, the pure people" and their "authentic" leaders who profess to care about "the ordinary person" and other denizens of the cultural, economic and political "hinterlands," nationally and internationally.
II The "Nullification" Alternative
Nullification-the idea that sub-national units can, and perhaps even ought to, refuse to enforce federal laws that they deem unconstitutional-is a somewhat different impulse within the broad class of separatist political voices. It lies in the fuzzy conceptual area between calls for all-out secession on the one hand and common displeasure expressed by sub-national units against unwelcome federal policies, laws, and regulations on the other. It is a recalcitrant gesture against central political authority by people who nevertheless do not want to slam the door shut on a political union or entity. Nullification, at least in its "classical" meaning, is the argument that a sub-national unit can declare legislation or a judicial decision from the central authority "null and void" because, according to the unit, such a decision violates the constitution regardless of whether or not the legitimate federal legislature and apex court of that polity consider it valid. It reflects a strong belief in subsidiarity (or its relatives: "states' rights" or "the states preceded the Union," "compound theory" and "dual federalism") as a core principle of political confederations and the source of constitutional sovereignty and authority more broadly. Nullification also bodes well with sentiments of "distinct society," authentic "local traditions" or "community values" that are dear to the unit's heart, and an overarching disdain for the supposedly elitist, inattentive, and detached central government. Nullification arguments are not invoked with respect to every disagreement between a sub-unit and a central authority; they are reserved for situations where a given sub-unit objects to a supposedly intrusive, centrally-imposed regulatory measure that is perceived to illegitimately infringe on a constitutional principle or belief indispensable to the sub-unit's fundamental identity.
Nullificationist voices have staged a certain comeback in American constitutional discourse. 48 
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Nationalist regimes in countries such as Hungary or Poland often draw on nullificationist sentiments in justifying legislative measures that restrict immigrant rights, gay rights, reproductive freedoms and other hallmarks of the prevalent "global constitutionalism" discourse, often in blatant disregard of relevant European Union policies. In direct defiance of EU policies on refugee acceptance, Viktor Orbán, Hungary's prime minister, suggested that Hungary does not need a single migrant for the economy to work, or the population to sustain itself, or for the country to have a future, every single migrant poses a public security and terror risk. For us migration is not a solution but a problem … not medicine but a poison, we don't need it and won't swallow it.
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What is more, [T] hose arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders. 52 In September 2017, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) upheld the EU migrant relocation scheme, and dismissed an appeal filed by Hungary and Slovakia, reaffirming the EU's prerogative to order individual member states to take in refugees. 53 Under the policy, Hungary is required to take in approximately 1,300 refugees while Slovakia is required to take in approximately 900. To that ruling Hungary's Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó reacted in a nullificationist fashion by stating that the ruling was "outrageous and irresponsible," that it "raped EU law" and that the "real battle (against Brussels) is just beginning." 54 Orbán added that compliance with the EU quota system would transform Hungary into an immigrant country, against the will of the people. 55 Because Hungary does not have a colonial legacy, it sees itself free of the moral obligations of many Western European nations that control the EU and ECJ agenda. Nullificationist sentiments are often tied to a given political or territorial sub-unit, but may also take the form of struggles over maintaining jurisdictional boundaries within pluri-legal regimes. In dozens of countries around the world (e. g., India, Indonesia, Israel) certain religious groups are granted varied measures of jurisdictional autonomy in matters of family and personal status law as well as in matters of denominational education. Attempts by central governments or national high courts to tamper with the jurisdictional autonomy of such groups have often been met with resistance, at times even sectarian violence and blatant non-compliance, by the affected minority religious groups.
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(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Despite its reassuring title, this new bill undid the court's ruling by eliminating Muslim women's recourse to state courts in appealing for post-divorce maintenance payments. 57 It also exempted Muslim ex-husbands from other post-divorce obligations. 58 So harsh was the Muslim dissenting reaction to Shah Bano that it is named by notable commentators among the catalysts for the subsequent ascent of right-wing Hindu politicians who accused the Congress Party of compromising the principles of secularism in order to appease Islamic fundamentalists and obtain Muslim votes. 59 Thus, whereas the Supreme Court of India has declared general social goals of creating a uniform civil code and weaving national integration, its secularist-progressive jurisprudence has (perhaps counterproductively at times) given rise to intense nullificationist sentiments within India's Muslim community and at a later stage, India's Hindu community. 60 Similar nullification claims have recently been raised amid a new iteration of the constitutional battle over Muslim divorce law that is currently deliberated before the Supreme Court of India-Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Others. 61 Following the Court's landmark ruling (3:2)
in August 2017 that declared the talaq instant divorce law unconstitutional on gender equality grounds, Muslim leaders and legal activists have vowed to contest the ruling. 62 Canada, too, has seen its fair share of secessionist and nullification-like challenges.
The constitutional battle over Quebec reached its zenith in 1998 with the Quebec Secession Reference-the first time a democratic country had ever preemptively tested the legal terms of its own dissolution. 63 Over the past two decades, calls for a full-blown Quebecois secession have subsided considerably.
However, nullification-like reactions to federal policies, in particular with respect to language, have been staged repeatedly. In the Quebec Veto Reference decision (1982), the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that there was no constitutional convention awarding Quebec a special veto power; and that Quebec's claim for a special veto power based on the "distinct society" and the "two founding peoples" arguments is not supported by any constitutional document or convention. 64 Despite this ruling, Quebec continued to assert that its legislature could exercise the right to veto constitutional provisions. In other words: nullification, Quebec-style. Beyond the constitutional mega-politics surrounding the tussles over the status of Quebec vis-à-vis the rest of Canada, much of Quebec's "day-to-day" nullificationist energy has revolved around the status of French language and culture. The numerous constitutional struggles over Quebec's Bill 101 or the Charter of the French Language (enacted 1977) provide a perfect illustration. Section 1 of Bill 101 establishes French as the official language of Quebec and the rest of the legislation focuses on the details of this legislative choice. One of the first challenges to Quebec's language policy as articulated in Bill 101 occurred in 1979 in the case of Quebec v. Blaikie.
65 At the time of this challenge, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was not yet in existence, so these provisions of Bill 101 were challenged based on section 133 of the BNA Act (now the Constitution Act, 1867), which states that either English or French may be used in debates in the legislature of Quebec, either language may be used in all of the courts of Quebec, and Acts from the legislature of Quebec must be printed and published in both languages. The SCC struck down provisions of Bill 101 for violating the constitution. In particular, the court emphasized that section 133 of the BNA Act required enactment in each language, rather than just publishing and printing (as Bill 101 provided for publication in English, but it was only the French version that was considered official).
One of the first post-1982 challenges to Bill 101 came in the Quebec Protestant School Boards Case (1984) . 66 The provisions of Bill 101 in question concerned which children were entitled to receive school instruction in English.
On the basis of several subsections of section 23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (section 23 protects minority language education rights, in this case of Quebec's Anglophone minority), the SCC held that the contested provisions of Bill 101 were unconstitutional. The challenges to Quebec's defiant approach reflected in Bill 101 continued in one of the most contentious cases, Ford v. Quebec (1988) . 67 In Ford, the SCC deemed that provisions of Bill 101 requiring that all Quebec signage, private commercial as well as public, be printed only in French contravened the language rights and freedom of expression provisions of the Charter. This is despite Quebec's attempt to pre-emptively nullify the actions of what they saw as a federally-oriented Court. Shortly after the Charter came into force in 1982, in an act of defiance, the Parti Québécois-controlled Quebec legislature passed an omnibus bill (Bill 178) that drew upon section 33 of the Charter-the "override clause"-to declare all laws enacted by it, past and present, as operative, notwithstanding sections 2 (fundamental freedoms) and sections 7 to 15 (due process and equality rights) of the Charter. Quebec drew upon that omnibus legislation to support its claim that Bill 101 could withstand a Charter-based constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court begged to differ. In the Ford ruling, it held that such a blanket use of an override declaration by the Quebec government was an improper and invalid application of the Charter's override clause. According to the Court, section 33 could only be applied toward a specific piece of legislation, for a limited fiveyear period (renewable), and it could only be applied vis-à-vis a concrete piece of legislation, not a hypothetical one. As one would expect, the Ford decision was not well-received in Quebec and generated substantial outcry, including furious street demonstrations and the legislature's recurring invocation of the override clause in direct response to the SCC's decision in Ford (despite the fact that Quebec has remained the only province not to have formally ratified the Constitution Act, 1982). in principle, French is the common official language of instruction in elementary and secondary schools in Quebec, but allows for children with some history of schooling in English to receive instruction in English in a public or subsidized private school in Quebec. This provision created a loophole that essentially allowed parents whose children were not entitled to instruction in English to send one or more of their children to unsubsidized private "bridging schools" (écoles passerelles) in English for a year so that they would then be eligible to attend publicly funded English schools. The SCC ruled unanimously that Bill 104 was "excessive" in its infringement upon parents' and children's minority language education rights. The court also held that the loophole affected few students and that it did not pose a threat to the vitality of the French language in the province. The court thus granted the government of Quebec a year to amend the law in a way that would more adequately balance the preferential status of French in Quebec and minority language education rights in that province. Quite predictably, the ruling reawakened strong nationalist sentiments in Quebec. Quebec Culture Minister, Christine St-Pierre, went on record stating that she was "disappointed and angered" by the decision. 70 Leader of the opposition Parti Québécois, Pauline
Marois, called on the premier, as the head of the Quebec nation, to protect the French language against the court decision. "The Supreme Court, a court named by another nation, has once again hacked away at a tool that is fundamental for the Quebec nation," Marois said, before moving an emergency motion that called on Quebec's legislature to "denounce" the decision and demanded that the premier stand up for the French language. These calls have not gone unanswered. As a recent study shows, the Quebec National Assembly repeatedly and effectively "reestablished the policy status quo that existed before judicial invalidation of key provisions of Bill 101," 71 thereby demonstrating the resilience of Quebec-style de-facto nullification. A glaring example is the Quebec response to the Nguyen decision, when the legislature under the Jean Charest government passed Bill 115 which introduced an even more restrictive approach to English language eligibility in Quebec. 72 The result of the success of legal mobilization as seen in Nguyen was a policy setback in the form of amendments to two acts, namely the Charter of the French Language and the Act respecting private education.
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III Constitutional Duality: The European Angle
Separation and nullification debates within federal or "pluri-national" states have interesting equivalents at the supra-national level of governance. In fact, precisely because the units in supra-national political associations preceded the association, and because such associations allow for multiple and parallel projects of national identity promotion, they are more likely than other political formations to experience secessionist or nullificationist pressures. 74 Since the 1950s, Europe has been witnessing what is arguably the largest experiment with multi-level governance in modern history. The quest for, and accompanying opposition to, the political and constitutional unification of Europe has been among the perennial sources of contention in virtually every member state of the now 28-country-strong European Union (Britain's post-Brexit relationship with the Union is yet to be determined), in several EU aspirants, as well as in the 47-member Council of Europe with its comprehensive pan-European human rights regime-the ECHR. As many observers have noted, trans-national constitutionalism has been a key concept in the quest for a unified Europe. 75 In its caselaw starting with the landmark Van Gend and Loos ruling (1963), the ECJ introduced the principle of the direct effect of Community law on the Member States, which now enables European citizens to rely directly on rules of the European Union law in their national courts. 76 In its 1964 ruling in the Costa case, the ECJ went on to establish the primacy of Community law over domestic law. 77 In 1991, (Francovich, Bonifaci and others v. Italy), the ECJ established the liability of a Member State to individuals for damage caused to them by a breach of Community law by that State. 78 The unification-through-constitutionalization project gained further momentum with the signings of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Lisbon Treaty (2009) that effectively establish a trans-national quasiconstitutional regime in the EU. Meanwhile, the ECtHR has become one of the busiest apex courts on the planet. This enormous unification-through-constitutionalization project now directly affects the lives of over 800 million people and indirectly impacts the lives of hundreds of millions more. In light of this, it is hardly surprising that strong resentment has fomented throughout Europe; a quick survey would yield a list of several hundred active separatist movements in Europe, stretching from Moravia and the Republic of Crimea to SchleswigHolstein and the Faroe Islands. From a comparative constitutional law standpoint, the emerging European constitutional order adds at least two interesting twists to the classic American nullification storyline. First, national high court rulings in Europe seem to reject the notion of unconditional subjection of Member State law to European transnational law. Instead, a notion of duality of constitutional authority (national and supra-national) first introduced by the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) in its landmark Maastricht Case ruling (1993) has become the mainstream vision of national/supra-national constitutional relations in the EU. 79 In its judgment, the FCC advanced a statist conception of the EU in which each Member State is an autonomous unit that retains its self-determination and sovereignty, including the ability to revoke its consent to participate in international organizations. 80 The FCC is clear that "[i]n contrast to the federal parliament, the 'European Community legislator' does not possess any direct democratic legitimation." 81 Adamant that member state sovereignty be main- The ruling's "bottom-line" is that the FCC affirmed the legitimacy and constitutionality (with respect to German law) of the Maastricht Treaty, yet reserved to itself the right to "examine whether legal acts of the European institutions and organs are within or exceed the sovereign powers transferred to them." 84 In other words, the FCC, not the ECJ, will decide where the limits to European power lie, at least with respect to Germany. Furthermore, the Court stated that legal acts of the EU determined by the FCC to lie outside the competences delineated in the Treaty, will not be legally binding in Germany.
In so deciding, the FCC maintained the authority to examine the applicability of EU law in Germany, thus posing a permanent Member State-based challenge to the overarching competence of EU laws and institutions. Implicit in the FCC's ruling, though not fully endorsed, is the notion that member states are to be pardoned for not enforcing what they regard as an imposed supplementary authority in a sphere not explicitly transferred from the sub-units to the EU. As one observer has noted, a comparison to the Kentucky and Virginia situation of 1798-1799 (where the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures passed resolutions that declared the federal Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional based on the notion that states had the right and duty to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional to the extent that they are regarded by states as not authorized by the Constitution) is not an implausible one.
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In its subsequent decision in the Lisbon Treaty Case (2009), arguably one of the most significant political rulings in its history, the FCC held that Germany must maintain its constitutional sovereignty within the emerging European constitution. 86 The case involved a claim by German nationals that an unconditional ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would jeopardize and unreasonably limit German constitutional autonomy and self-determination. The Court agreed that European constitutional integration is not an automatic and inescapable process; under certain circumstances, the Court may review the implications of such integration on German constitutional sovereignty, and, when needed, opt out on an issue-by-issue basis. The judges held that "if obvious transgressions of boundaries take place when the European Union claims competences," then they will call for a review to "preserve the inviolable core content of the [German] Basic Law's constitutional identity." 87 Moreover, EU institutions must respect the non-transferable identity of member states' constitutions and the principles they enshrine, as well as a minimum core of sovereignty vested in national political institutions. Specifically, the FCC identified five areas of competence where full subjection of national power to EU authorities could seriously erode German sovereignty: the armed forces' monopoly on the use of force; criminal law; fundamental fiscal policy decisions, and state budgetary autonomy more generally; substantive understanding of what constitutes a just social order; and, most importantly, the preservation of national identity, especially through state control over the education system. When it comes to these areas, the FCC held, legitimate and accountable national political institutions must retain the ability to effectively determine policy and maintain state autonomy. At the more abstract level, the Court held that "a will aiming at founding a [federal] state in Europe could not be ascertained," and that, as Kommers and Miller point out, "the civil society, or demos, essential to democracy … still is centered on the nation-state, framed by a common language, culture, and history."
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To be sure, the FCC's judgment may easily be interpreted as suggesting both solid German constitutional sovereignty vis-à-vis the emerging European constitutional order, as well as provisional subjection of the former to the latter. Either way, for the purposes of our comparative discussion, it is evident that that the FCC did not endorse the Euro-centric view of unconditional subjection of any given Member State's constitutional order and identity to the emerging transnational European constitution. We may call it nullification, or perhaps Germanstyle nullification in potentia. Opting Out of "Global Constitutionalism" EU member-state constitutional courts do occasionally go even further in maintaining national constitutional sovereignty vis-à-vis the emerging panEuropean constitutional order. In December 2016, to pick one recent example, the Supreme Court of Denmark decided in the Ajos Case that the judge-made principles of EU law concerning non-discrimination on the grounds of age developed after the Danish Accession Act (2008) were not binding. 89 The Court went on to decide that it would exceed its own mandate within the Danish constitutional framework if it gave priority to EU law over Danish law in such situations. 90 A few months earlier, the Russian Constitutional Court reached a similar decision-an ECtHR ruling may not be implemented in Russia as it contradicts the Russian Constitution-with respect to the ECtHR's 2013 ruling on prisoners' voting rights in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia.
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As we have seen earlier, resentment toward the emerging pan-European constitutional framework has been on the rise in several European countries. However, some of that dissent has been mitigated through constitutional means. In fact, the multi-layered, fragmented structure of the European constitutional framework and the corresponding eminence of the pan-European rights regime have given rise to a second uniquely European addition to the American nullification narrative-the theoretical posture known as constitutional pluralism. Building on the German Federal Constitutional Court's Maastricht Case articulation of dual (EU and German) constitutional authority, proponents of this view describe a reality of, and provide normative justification for, a post-national, multi-focal constitutional order (at least with respect to the distribution of constitutional authority in Europe) in which there is no single legal center or hierarchy, and "where there is a plurality of institutional normative orders, each with its functioning constitution." 92 This stance is reflected in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, as it walks a fine line between fostering a robust pan-European human rights regime while national (in the European context, sub-unit) constitutional sovereignty vis-à-vis a largely fictitious supra-national consensus.
A key concept that guides such rulings is the "margin of appreciation." 97 The Council of Europe defines "margin of appreciation" as the space for maneuvering that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities in fulfilling their obligations under the ECHR. 98 From a jurisprudential standpoint, the margin of appreciation is a judicial doctrine whereby supra-national courts allow states to have a measure of diversity in their interpretation of human rights treaty obligations, based on local traditions, heritage, and context. Essentially a concept of qualified and reasoned deference, margin of appreciation is at the core of some of the most important rulings of the ECtHR, and has become increasingly central to the viability and future of the entire ECHR system. This trend has been given the formal stamp of approval in 2013, when the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Protocol 15 to the European Convention on Human Rights, which seeks to encourage the incorporation of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation within the ECHR and ECtHR system. It has been further strengthened in the intergovernmental 2015 Brussels Declaration, which [r] eiterates the subsidiary nature of the supervisory mechanism established by the Convention and in particular the primary role played by national authorities, namely governments, courts and parliaments, and their margin of appreciation in guaranteeing and protecting human rights at national level, while involving National Human Rights Institutions and civil society where appropriate.
Conclusion
Global convergence processes-economic, cultural, and constitutional-are undeniable. But divergence, and at times resistance, persist. As the examples explored in this essay illustrate, secession, nullification, and other constitutional "opting out" impulses have not vanished in the age of constitutional globalization. In fact, evidence may suggest that powerful centripetal forces of political, economic, and cultural convergence have triggered more, not less, separatist talk (and, oftentimes, actual walk) in national and supra-national sub-units worldwide. The current wave of neo-secessionism and other like-minded aversions towards constitutional convergence provide ample evidence that global constitutionalism is not the only game in town.
This general trend is driven by different impulses in different times and places. Classic secessionist and nullificationist inclinations are often guided by ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious difference sentiments that draw on some historical records of sub-national unit sovereignty marked along these ascriptive lines. More recent neo-secessionist impulses are driven by a populist-nationalist "us first" sentiment mounted against increased globalization and threats, real or perceived, to national sovereignty and policy-making capacity. Other separatist sentiments are driven by ideological resentment of "big government," elite-rule or a "corrupt center" as opposed to supposedly authentic localism, or are powered by clashes over material interests (e. g., revenue or resource allocation; access to and position within the labor market). And yet others associate global constitutional discourse with excessive social progressiveness and concern with minority rights, or pit liberal or neoliberal, self-professed cosmopolitan elites (often perceived as occupying a given polity's political or symbolic "center") against less liberal, localist voices (often perceived as occupying or representing that polity's socio-political "hinterlands" or cultural "periphery"). 104 Meanwhile, left-leaning neo-secessionism is driven by rejection of wholesale global economic convergence and the prioritization of transnational trade agreements and constitutional protection of investor rights. Obviously, there is much more at stake in any of these debates than whether the local, the national, or the global is the proper locus of sovereignty. And to be sure, there are differences among the various polities where voices of separation and disengagement have gained public support. But these differences notwithstanding, the general trend towards political and constitutional convergence, globalism and supra-nationalism have spawned an array of localist counter-movements that profess to represent a given polity's, region's or a community's "genuine" identity. 105 As such, the more expansive constitutional convergence trends are, the more apparent the paradox of global constitutionalism becomes as the likelihood of dissent and resistance increases. Finally, the political economy of secession, old or new, operates on a considerably more complex coordination and compliance grounds than that of nullification and other pinpointed constitutional opting out mechanisms. 106 Whereas the potential benefits of secessionist threats to the unit making them are obvious, the tremendous economic, diplomatic, and legal costs of secession's actual realization render it unlikely in most established settings. Even from a pure constitutional standpoint, territorial secession faces significant hurdles that often render it impractical. 107 Thus, we may speculate that, as internationalization and global convergence processes march on, it may be the case that debates over neo-secessionism as identified above or over nullification-like constitutional devices become even more prevalent, as well thought-out, "selective" rejection, invalidation and repudiation mechanisms offer a more practical means of enhancing unit constitutional autonomy than the bolder, yet often impracticable notion of fullblooded secession. Constitutional innovators in complex, multi-layered polities may wish to take notice as they think creatively about constitutional mechanisms aimed at allowing for greater "voice"-including oppositional voice-as an alternative to fuming "exit" options (to borrow Albert Hirschman's famous terminology) if they seek to keep the overarching framework intact while acknowledging the counterforces unleashed by global constitutionalism.
